Weak Ontology, Strong Generosity

In a critique of Scott Eric Kaufman's draft paper on the history of theory in literary studies (which I haven't read; I recommend, though, the terrific discussion over at Rough Theory)  Eileen Joy rightly draws attention to Stephen White's discussion of weak ontology. Indeed, to my mind, Scott's emphasis (as channeled by N. Pepperell) on "an aggressive commitment to strong beliefs, weakly held" is more akin to William Connolly's ethos of pluralization and commitment to the cultivation of an ethos of generosity (White discusses Connolly's work in detail in Sustaining Affirmation; White's notion of weak ontology in fact draws heavily from Connolly and attempts to mediate between Connolly's Deleuze-indebted 'immanent naturalism' and the work of other political theorists--in particular, Charles Taylor, Judith Butler, and George Kateb).

Is this interesting primarily as a matter of academic pedantry or turf warfare (along the lines of "gee, political theorists have already been talking about this for quite a while")? Perhaps. But there could be more at stake. Differently put, that Connolly has worked out these notions in several books that have been the subject of sustained discussion among political theorists for the last decade might shed light on potential ramifications of an "aggressive commitment to strong beliefs weakly held" (it is also likely that the disciplinary difference here is significant--Scott says that literary theorists are more interested in imagined worlds; political theorists, for all our engagement with ideals, remain imbricated in this one, for better or worse). Here are a few possibilities:

1.  Among political theorists, Connolly tends to be associated with poststructuralism (his archive is heavy on Deleuze and Foucault and critical of foundationalist, universalist, and dogmatic approaches ).

2.  Connolly's pluralism is not deliberative. That is, it is neither rooted in nor presupposes the possibility (or even desirability) of discussion. It thus accepts a fundamental incommensurability but wants to defang it.

3.  This is where 'weakly held' comes in. Connolly expresses it as an awareness of the contestability of one's own fundaments.

4.  To my mind, this is where the difficulties come in. It is one thing to recognize the contestability of one's fundaments when one is thinking, reading, and writing. In some ways, it is simply another way to understand good old Kantian reflexivity/universalizability. It may even be another way of 'including oneself in the picture' and recognizing that any view that one has of the whole is already part of that very whole, inside it, operating within it. Yet, it is another thing entirely to engage politically from such a view.

Or, perhaps a better way to put it is to say that different things can follow from such contestability. One can stop fighting to death, aware that one may be wrong--gee, maybe slavery is God's will or maybe women really are incapable of reasoning. Or, one can fight to the death, knowing full well that this may ultimately have been wrong and pointless. Contestability, then, may be simply another way of saying that nothing is certain, that certainty is an inhuman element.

5.   An additional difficulty with placing one's political eggs in the contestability basket is a matter of political strategy. When one's opponents are possessed of an inhuman certainty, when they are motivated to realize their vision of the world, to respond by saying that, really, they need to demonstrate more humility is inadequate. That is not the way to defeat them. Instead, one needs to affirm the contest aspect of contestability, the aspect of struggle--force decides.

Addendum: Rich Puchalsky, in the comment thread at Rough Theory, doubts that argument can overcome a determined a commitment to incommensurability. I'm not sure I know what he means. For me, incommensurability isn't something one is committed to or not. It's a description of the world (I prefer the term collapse of symbolic efficiency) that one can try to refute, resolve, deny, or accommodate. Generosity toward incommensurable views or positions is one mode of accommodation. In the political world, this is rarely possible (modus vivendi is one fragile possibility). In the academic world, it is often decided/determined budgetarily, but remains as a site of conflict and contestation--actually, not unlike in the political world. Perhaps, though, conflict over the details, the working through of momentary compromises is not trivial. Perhaps it is a kind of inching forward toward a necessarily impossible and unattainable resolution.

Comments

[A.E.]

I don't really have a background in philosophy. I was only introduced to Zizek and Baudrillard because of the books they wrote about 9/11. Those books changed my life and my way of seeing the world, especially Zizek's. Reading "Welcome to the Desert of the Real" was like being hit with a 2,000 pound bomb.

If anything, the best thing that can be said about Zizek is that he sparked my interest in critical theory and philosophy--and I'm a person who used to regard both as pure nonsense.

[Alain]

Hi Jodi, very interesting post. I am particularly struck by "Generosity toward incommensurable views or positions is one mode of accommodation. In the political world, this is rarely possible..." In the United States today, I would argue this is clearly impossible. There is no generosity being put forward by the Right - their strategy seems to be "take no prisoners" - even after the mid term elections. I think this is precisely the impass traditional pluralism is inadequate to address and why "weak ontology" really doesn't get us very far.

[discard]

I am a bit suspect of this notion of generosity amidst pluralism. Not the pluralism part, but rather the generosity part. Let me be clear, i'm not seeking to protest a politics of that which pluralism, or Alain above, seeks to oppose -- i.e., a politics of an ungenerous right, of an inhuman certainty, etc.

It's just that it seems hard to separate this sort of pluralism from liberalism. Isn't the liberal subject maintained in the mode of "the one who holds whatever perspective 'weakly'"? That is, weakness seems to reintroduce a "one" that governs, even if only in the last instance, even if only by setting forth a hermeneutic/dialogical horizon, the plurality.

[Wade]

I'm not sure that the weak ontology thing is identical to the generosity you're describing. If it is, it's hard to see how Taylor's philosophy would fit the label, since Taylor rules out our knowing beforehand that different ethical orientations can't be reconciled.

[jdean]

Wade--White draws from Taylor, but doesn't agree with everything Taylor says. One of the things he draws from Taylor is a sense of 'sources,' which he, White, understands in terms of the conditions of weak ontology. Sources might be thought of as incitements, commitments, ideals, starting points that one brings to bear on one's thinking and on one's positions. So, White thinks that Taylor is strong on sources but weak on, well, 'weakness;' conversely, Butler is weak on sources but strong on 'weakness' (or, contestability of fundaments).

Discard--I think the similarity to liberalism is strong. Where Connolly differs is with regard to liberalism's investment in secularism, one, and on the foundationalist justification strategies associated with political liberalism.

Alain--I completely agree with you. I don't want to be generous to the Right. And, I think that when, say, Democrats, are generous to the Right, they get eaten alive. Well, it's better to eat than be eaten.

[Ben]

Hi,

Stephen White comes to mind when people discuss about weak ontology in the US. There is a precedent in Italian debates of the 1980s. Perhaps one could trace the discussion around this back to Gianni Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti' edited volume on 'weak thought' (Il pensiero debole, 1983). The essays by Vattimo and Rovatti themselves, but also Crespi, develop the idea of weak thought as part of a project of post-foundationalism.

[Jodi]

Thanks, Ben, I appreciate the cites--I'm not familiar with this work.