July 31, 2008

Who, we?

Today I came across a tirade against someone's use of the word 'we' in a piece of academic critical media theory writing. The upshot: to use 'we' is to suggest proud egoistic self-mastery as well as hypocritical participation in the social order. Now, I didn't read the essay being criticized. I'm taking up the attack on 'we,' then, not as a discussion of specific criticism but because the attack is a commonplace among left theorists. I've been seeing it rather frequently in graduate student papers, a critique wielded with intense sincerity, as if the person who used the term were singularly responsible for the invasion of Iraq or the genocide against Native Americans (a horrible term itself, but I'll save discussion of it for later). Attacking 'we' is a cheap shot that substitutes for engaging someone's argument. It's one of those pc monkey-tricks along the lines of "you erase difference in a logic of the same" and "what do you mean by 'women' given that there are differences between and among women?"

"We" can be annoying when the author is referring to herself in the first-person plural, like the Queen. "We think that set theory radically subverts biopolitics." But, although annoying, this assertion of 'we' is neither more nor less an indication of self-mastery than the assertion of an "I." Both designate the speaking position of the author. In English, they are grammatically pretty useful, enabling the avoidance of unwieldy passive voice constructions. They also render the author accountable for a position. For example, the issue isn't whether torture may be considered a lawful interrogation technique; the issue is whether the Bush administration viewed it and authorized it as a lawful interrogation technique. And,insofar as we speak in first person constructions, "I'll have cheese, please," aware that we split subjects, subjects who err, subjects who are spoken through, subjects who are uncertain and in flux, no pronoun, plural or otherwise, can install an already impossible mastery. This is the challenge of responsibility: taking it even when mastery is impossible.

Some of us write with 'we' as a way of including ourselves in the group being criticized: "as bloggers we waste way too much time." This kind of writing is sometimes difficult in feminist classrooms where women students are pulled between referring to women as 'they' or as 'we'. The inclusive 'we' can also be useful in attempts to interpellate a collective, to call into being a 'we' where there might not have been one before. Politicians also use this version of 'we'. For critical theorists, this 'we' strikes me as crucial: no one is outside ideology.

One of the trickiest "we's" comes in when the author is trying to speak of and to a discipline or movement, for example, where 'we' refers to political theorists in general or the left in general. So the writer might say something like "political theorists have ignored the emotions; we need to take emotions into account." And the critical response is--whom do you have in mind? Can't be Machiavelli, Spinoza, Hobbes, or Hume, for a start. This is the easiest use of 'we' to avoid, primarily because it isn't necessary for the point.

Ultimately, what bugs me the most about critiques of 'we' is the way that they mobilize a suspicion toward collectivity and privilege individualism. To this extent, they are little machines or engines of neoliberalism, neoliberal-bots that drive writers and thinkers to dismantle any collective sense or feeling of solidarity in advance, to suspect such sentiments rather than be responsible to them. Most of us who write in contemporary left political and media theory have been reading and writing about difference for a long time now. It's time that we redirect the suspicions leveled toward collectivity toward suppositions of individuality and autonomy.

June 23, 2008

Theory & Event 11.2 now available

The new issue of Theory & Event is now online and available to subscribers through Project Muse. As you will see below, the issue explores themes of terror and political violence.

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_&_event/

Below you'll find the table of contents for the issue as well as the editors' introduction.

Table of Contents:

"We are all torturers now": Accountability After Abu Ghraib
Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn

Necessary Interruption: Traces of the Political in Levinas
Erica Weitzman

Lethal Freedom: Divine Violence and the Machiavellian Moment
Michael Dillon

Event or Exception?: Disentangling Badiou from Schmitt, or, Towards a Politics of the Void
Colin Wright

Imagining Extraordinary Renditions: Terror, Torture and the Possibility of an Excessive Ethics in Literature
Nathan Gorelick

Reviews
Critique of Abysmal Reasoning
Brian Goldstone

Imperialism and the Intimate Self
Robert Lee Nichols

Escaping the Cult, Recuperating Victims
Judy Rohrer

Reason and Revolution Redux: Antonio Negri's Political Descartes
Robert T. Tally

Continue reading "Theory & Event 11.2 now available" »

May 20, 2008

Eat the tentative!

Why do people bother to write articles that are tentative suggestions based on insignificant differences? Why do they write pages upon pages of allegedly critical interrogation when they are conceding all the major points, when they admit that the object of their criticism fully knows whatever point they are making but 'perhaps doesn't emphasize it enough'? My god, this is idiocy on stilts. Such 'arguments' aren't worth the time it takes to read them much less write them.

Yes, people have to publish or perish. Yes, much critical-theoretical academic work requires interpretation, working through, the tracing of small differences. But that doesn't mean that others should be subjected to all this. A quick summary will do just fine, thank you. Better--save it for a footnote in a project where you are really doing something.

And another thing: I really hate academic articles that tell us what we should be doing and criticize us for ignoring something or other. The back story for those pieces: "I just discovered some really cool literature (critical geography, neuroscience, set theory) that I didn't even know existed!" And so the enthusiastic author now criticizes her past self for not having known this neat stuff, but she calls this past self 'us' or 'political theory.'

Last--all this applies to me.

May 15, 2008

Quarterly Journal of Speech

The new issue of the Quarterly Journal of Speech is out (volume 94, number 2, May 2008). It looks very good. Actually, it's an excellent journal (I'm pretty thrilled that I've been added to the board because I didn't know much about the work in critical rhetorical studies). The new issue has a review of Zizek's Politics. It also has a review of a book by Thomas Rickert likely to interest readers of I Cite, Acts of Enjoyment: Rhetoric, Zizek, and the Return of the Subject as well as review of Leslie Paul Thiele's The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative. The lead article in the journal takes up Lacan and love; another considers the political economy of rhetorical style, and still another one makes a case for "critical affect studies."

Meme: Passion Quilt

Tensofthousandsofstars_2 Who cares what it means. What does it say?

Sinthome tagged me with the passion quilt meme. Here it is:

“Post a picture or make/take/create your own that captures what YOU are most passionate for students to learn about.

Give your picture a short title.

Title your blog post “Meme: Passion Quilt.”

Link back to this blog entry.

Include links to 5 (or more) educators.”

Pinocchio Theory
Spurious
Before the Law
Gonzalo Portocarrero
Ads without products

My title is, "Who cares what it means. What does it say?" I'm most passionate about my students learning to read. It seems that for many of them texts in philosophy and political theory are just blurry zones of overlapping type. Words don't seem to be words. Sentences aren't sentences. Instead, type is opportunity for them to project, emote, identify, reject, or opine. If they could read, that is, if they could get to the point where they can start figuring out what a text says, then I might be able to talk with them about ways that it might mean something.

April 29, 2008

The academic climate

If academics were serious about climate change, we'd stop flying so much.

A mid-level academic likely attends at least one major conference a year, maybe two. She might get invitations to speak a few times a year. Folks who are in greater demand as well as those hoping to get their work before more audiences will fly more than this. In 2007 I went to South America twice, the UK once, and Europe three times. I also flew domestically, but didn't count those.

A department running a search might bring in anywhere between two and ten job candidates. Conversely, a hot candidate might have fifteen or so interviews.

And let's not forget the academic couples that can't get positions close to each other. In some instances, one or the other flies every weekend.

This adds up to lots of miles in the air, lots of emissions.

What would an academic no-fly zone or list look like?

For starters, academics would have to get rid of the notion that the expert is the one from far away. They'd have to cultivate awareness of the work of people who are close by, work more collaboratively with colleges and universities in their neighborhoods.

What about ending small meetings, the small expert, invitation only conferences that solidify networks and often lead to edited volumes or special issues of journals?  What about ending mega-conferences, the huge national and international conferences of over 5000 people? Are these really necessary? No one goes to every panel when 70 are scheduled at the same time. No one even attends all the panels in their speciality. No one even has face time with all the people they want to meet. Sure, it's fun to meet with friends, to see what scholar x looks like close up. But many complain about the big meetings anyway--they are impersonal, meat-markets, degrading, and, well, big.

A number of groups and associations already post papers online in advance of a meeting. There have also been multiple efforts, of varying degrees of success, at holding online or virtual conferences (whether through text based interactions or in Second Life, whether in real time or over the space of several months).

Admittedly, it's not the same. The demands of everyday life intrude and make it hard to spend hours in front of the computer. But, hey, many of us already do this (we are bloggers, after all). Colleges and universities could acknowledge and facilitate e-conference days. Here they might encourage small groups' participation and interaction online. (I'm not explaining this well. But in March, seven members of my department flew from upstate NY to San Francisco for academic meetings. With e-meetings, we could have been in a smart classroom, on screens, but also communicating with each other f2f and in real time. Likewise, folks from other schools that are close by (in Rochester, Ithaca, Syracuse) could have met up, again, having a mini f2f conference alongside the bigger one on the west coast.

We could eliminate the campus visit for job candidates. Job candidates could post their jobtalks on YouTube. Search committees would be forced actually to read the writing samples.There could be online interviews. Again, many places already do phone interviews as part of the search.

What will be interesting: the ways that academics fail to act responsibly, the ways we won't give up our travel and our meetings. Business people are much worse than we are. Scholarship requires meeting with other people. Good ideas need to be presented and defended. How can we stay up with our fields? The real answer, though, is we enjoy it. Flying around makes us feel important.

February 22, 2008

Cultural Politics 4.1

Cultural Politics  Volume 4  Number 1 March 2008
 
The Voice of the People? Musicians as Political Actors

Seth Hague, John Street, and Heather Savigny on Bob Geldof, Live 8 and the legacies of Rock Against Racism

Making Space: Image-Events in an Extreme State

Johanna Drucker asks whether in our image-saturated culture works of imaginative art can have any impact?

Enjoying Neoliberalism

Jodi Dean on Slavoj Zizek, ideology, and the global formations of the neoliberal order Download neoliberal_fantasy_article.pdf

‘Wikivism’: From Communicative Capitalism to Organized Networks

Paul Stacey on the cultures of networked technologies, Wikis, and postrepresentative politics

Field Report

Can a Place Think? On Adam Sharr’s Heidegger’s Hut

Timothy Clark on Heidegger's work hut at Todtnauberg, contemporary thought , and the 'earth'

Book Review Essay

Academics Behaving Badly

Ian Gordon on intellectuals, their duties, and their engagements in Eric Lott's The Disappearing Liberal Intellectual and Stefan Collini's Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain

February 14, 2008

Recommending Hitler

What are the obligations a professor owes her students and how far do they extend?

It is clear that grades should not be based on political persuasion, profession of faith, or, why not, conception of the good. I am enormously uneasy with advocacy in the classroom, thinking that more often than not it starts to tie grades to one of these. This can be a problem in courses in feminist theory or women's studies. In my course in feminist legal theory, I deal with the problem by testing the students' knowledge of and facility with majority and dissenting opinions in legal cases, as well as critiques of the way the cases are framed.

But that's easy. Here is the harder problem: what if a student with a political or world view that one finds completely repellent wants a recommendation, for law school or for a job? And what if he or she has performed well in the classes, so that one would write him or her a glowing recommendation but for the repellent world view? Do I commend the academic skills of an advocate for torture, an immigration wall, 100 years in Iraq? What about for a future lawyer dedicated to altering the Constitution by insuring that America returns to God? What about a future lawyer dedicated to a constitutional amendment in defense of marriage and the sanctity of the lives of the unborn?

I can imagine that it must have been the case that students in the late sixties feared that their life chances would be altered by their opposition to the war in Viet Nam. But perhaps what makes their opposition brave is precisely the fact that it was opposition; it was against the views of their professors and they did take a risk.

Can students justifiably expect to have it both ways? To have a right to express their convictions and a right not to be accountable to or responsible for them?

February 12, 2008

Well-rounded

What would a setting look like in which the most interesting, the most brilliant, the creative, the most innovative, the most thoughtful thinkers and scholars worked and lived? What would be the best setting for the best intellectual work? It's hardly a newsflash that the university isn't it. In fact, there is likely an inverse correlation between the university and intellectual work.

It may be that the 'best ever intellectual setting' is simply a fantasy, an impossible object of desire, never realizable. But why? And why does the university seem to miss so very badly?

Given that there are so many answers, this is likely a poorly posed question. We can think of corporate and government intervention and the desire to maintain pipelines into each as well as disciplinary fiefdoms and interest in maintaining hierarchies. There are others reasons as well: egocentricism and insecurity, the fear of being wrong, of being exposed, of not being up-to-date, of being a fraud and a faker. These fears have a far worse impact that the corrupting influences of market and state. They make people reluctant to take risks, to think more broadly, to disrupt their worlds and modes of thinking (which is what intellectual work actually requires).

In the contemporary academy, a host of buzzwords stand in for the celebration and promotion of mediocrity: the person is well-rounded (which means not excellent), the person is clear (which means that I understood everything she said and so wasn't challenged to think differently), the person is nice (which means she didn't respond sharply or pointedly or indicate how stupid my questions were and how I clearly had no idea of what she was talking about), the person has potential (which means that I have already mastered every aspect of my field and so can categorize this person quickly and easily and thereby be affirmed in my own knowledge and brilliance), the person would fit in well (which means remain unthreatening to current hierarchies and fragile self-esteem), the person wants to be here (which means that what is really at stake is my desire to be desired, recognized, wanted, valued).

Unfortunately for me, I remain an idealist and so I continue to find this embrace of mediocrity (particularly in its democratic form--all qualified applicants are equal means that none is greater than another) shocking and heart-breaking. Nonetheless, idealism wears out so in a few years I'm sure I'll lose the capacity even to recognize excellence (although I will recognize competence, clarity, and overall niceness, the real values of the contemporary university that wants to produce nice competent finance analysts and supervisors for various sorts of enterprises).

January 31, 2008

Awe

I heard a breathtaking job talk tonight (not in political science, not surprisingly). In recent years I've noticed that my ability to separate bullshit and jargon from new and interesting ideas has improved. Most of the time, I can tell the difference. But, I sometimes worry--was that really smart and I just can't see it? The talk I heard tonight clearly demonstrated the difference between something nuanced and difficult and something that is either pretending or not quite there. I feel pretty humbled. This guy is the real deal, really outstanding, really thinking in a wonderful way that challenges me because I'm not there. And it wasn't just because he could recite lines and passages in various languages from the ancients through the present. It was because there was a depth of thinking that opened up glimmers into something more than has been thought.