In Ticklish Subject, Zizek considers that happens after the fantasy is traversed, after the subject is destitute, after the subject has moved beyond the dialectic of law and desire. This, he remarks, is a central problem in the later Lacan. Zizek observes that Lacan is ambiguous on the point. And he offers the following explanation.
First, he considers Jacques-Alain Miller's suggestion that after the fantasy is traversed there is a kind of jouissance in language, a kind of pleasure in meaningless, empty speech. Yet, this fails as a move beyond drive:
but the happy babble doesn't involve any experience of the Real qua impossible. So, the problem with Miller's solution is that it identifies l'apparole with the unconstrained reign of the pleasure principle which precludes the dimension of the Real. And this can't be drive because drive is beyond the pleasure principle.
I haven't read the Miller piece (and I don't know if it has been translated). As I've understood Zizek's point here, it's not convincing. That is, it strikes me that Miller's point makes sense read as a description of a condition of the decline of symbolic efficiency or as a society of drive, a society after the law has lost its place and role. So this isn't a nice analytic cure, remedy, or conclusion. But it is what happens in the circuits of drive. What about the Real? Perhaps the Real is the impossibility of breaking out of the circuits, the very self-enclosure that forecloses any beyond? We might think of nightmare images of door, after door, after door, repeating ad infinitum.
But Zizek offers a different solution. He says that the only consistent solution is that l'apparole is not primordial. Something precedes it: the pre-synthetic imagination, which is not the blissful circuit of self-satisfied drive. It's not the lips kissing themselves or the making oneself seen. Rather it
This is of course the theme of TS, the break, gap, cut, that establishes the subject, that underlies Being. What isn't clear to me, though, is whether this makes sense as an account of drive. Or, differently put, thinking drive in terms of a cut or intervention or disruption makes sense with respect to the pleasure principle, the organic cycles of life, or even the Symbolic. But I'm less convinced (or more confused) that it provides a way to understand the functioning of drive in the present, from within our conjuncture.
I can put this as a question: isn't it possible that, in the wake of the decline of symbolic efficiency, the circling of drive, drive's movement from partial object to partial object, becomes the structure of a socio-economic-political formation that has already captured the subject's fixation? So stuckness isn't a break with conventional reality but rather its form?
At any rate, Zizek then moves to the desire of the analyst as what comes after the drive. The subject is in the position of the analyst (this is tricky, though, insofar as this is indistinguishable from the way a perverse discourse would be structured). The implications are the possibility of "'a communal big Other' that avoids the transferential effect of the subject supposed to know, believe, enjoy" (or, consume, blog, text, confess...). The desire of the analyst (and we should keep in mind the structure of the discourse of the analyst) is a way to consider a new form of the big Other that makes collectivity possible.
Or, the new form of the big Other, of collectivity, doesn't involve law and relations of transference to an idealized symbolic other but a constant thrust of transference through networks of imaginary others.