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November 20, 2006

Wikification and the decline of symbolic efficiency

I spend my days whining about my cold--I've been sick now for a week--and worrying about the upcoming symposium "Toward a Philosophy of the Vernacular?" at Newcastle-on-Tyne this weekend. I'm going to be a disaster--everyone else it seems has something to say about music. I have nothing to say about music. I'm afraid, ever afraid, that a shorter version of that sentence is closer to the truth. At any rate, I'm trying to organize my thinking about 9/11 conspiracy theories into something that won't humilate me and forever reveal my inadequacies. At least this worry is displacing my fear of flying.

Anyway, I'm thinking about the way we are perhaps in the middle of a perfect storm of doubt and disbelief, one which we might think of in terms of the collapse of the conditions of possibility for credibility, or with Zizek, in terms of the decline of symbolic efficiency. Nothing—or nearly nothing—is accepted on face value. The most important aspects of our lives cannot be established with certainty—new information appears daily, new questions are asked, new answers provided; we must continue to check to see if our information, our cites, our sources, are still there, updated, or outdated.

And, it seems to me that wikification might be a valuable metaphor for thinking about the decline of symbolic efficiency; not only is there no one single authority, nor one standard of reason that holds our facts together, but also anything that is entered can be changed, altered, revised.

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maybe you could write about the fantasy drive of academics who believe that they have nothing to say and are incompetent, but that this is a form of problematic that compels academics as thinkers to think on, and that the academics in question are actually quite brilliant? isn't this the diagrammatic form of the vernacular? in the cramped space of seeming impossibilities something creative emerges... :)

cute comment--and very nice and much, much appreciated! Spurious is of course the master of this style. I think that you are right when you link the fantasy to the drive to go on. If I thought that what I would say would be earth shaking or brilliant or totally original, I would be completely paralyzed with anxiety and insecurity, knowing that this is an impossibility. Accepting the limits and the impossibilities lets me go on...and add to the amount of bullshit in the world while getting a free trip to England.

I hope you feel better soon Jodi. These days I'm increasingly coming to believe that what's important isn't so much having something to say, but finding the will to continue speaking even when one feels that what they're saying has already been said. That is, I think the material trace a saying leaves in both the minds of others, electronic recordings, and texts is every bit as important as the originality of saying and that there's something to be said for repetition. As you've no doubt noticed, Zizek often repeats entire passages from other books he's written in the latest text he's working on. I don't think this is simply laziness or sloppiness on his part, but a sort of preservation designed to produce the most saturated dissemination possible. So too every time a thinker is taught or a concept is repeated. I think this repetition is a necessary condition for changing the socius itself.

Sinthome,
That's a good point. I also agree that repetition matters, that points should be repeated. And, that's the most interesting way of thinking about Zizek's repetitions that I've come across.

I worry, though, about repeating in practice, especially for us lesser mortals. I've heard people critize folks for giving the same paper a couple of times, for giving a paper that has been published, for having only one point which they repeat ad nauseum. But, it's likely that invoking this big Other (people who criticize) as a way to avoid facing or owning or confronting the need to repeat.

Yeah, I know some who repeat in this way, but I'd feel a good deal of guilt presenting the same paper at different conferences. I think there's the more virtuous repetition of a theme, concept, or line of argument that then begins to saturate the social field and become a reality that has to be responded to, even if negatively. Hopefully, even the counter-argument must concede something to what it opposes. As a Lacanian interested in clinical practice, for instance, I don't think of my scholarly work on Lacan as being so much an issue of giving a unique reading of Lacan or discovering something new in Lacan (though those things are nice too), but of taking part in making Lacan present outside literature departments in concrete practice. This is done by patiently explaining Lacanian concepts, organizing professional conferences for clinicians (such as the APW and the WPO conferences and training seminars), and making analysis available to those for whom it would not otherwise be available due to geography (many Lacanians practice phone analysis, for instance). Each year the APW conferences grow a bit larger (they went from about a dozen participants and are now quite large) and the WPO has been successful in offering study days all over the summer. These events draw the interest not only of scholars in the humanities, but curious clinicians that have heard of Lacanian psychoanalysis without being familiar with it. These clinicians outside psychoanalysis then steal a concept here or there, or repeat to others what they've heard, and the next thing you know you have a movement that was before exotic and all but invisible, such that clinicians and theorists with other therapeutic orientations have to begin taking this orientation seriously and seeking to refute it or integrate it. The goal, of course, is not integration, but the transformation of the entire social field. Alright, enough of my rambling! Good luck at the conference!

There's a difference, I think, between giving the same paper at a number of conferences and seminars during its gestation and, indeed, up to about the time that it goes into print. (Afterall, people want to hear a popular/good paper first hand.) The problem, for me at least, is when you (generic, of course) are invited to give an endowed, named, annual (etc) lecture - presumably with attached fee/stipend, or, at least, travel and a nice hotel - and it is the same old. (I'm thinking, for instance, at David Held's recent lecture in Ottawa that I complained about it: something he first give nearly a year and a half ago, that was in print over half a year ago, and something that was read verbatim all the same - with appropriate Canada jokes included, of course.)

The problem, for me, would not be in your trying out the same idea in a variety of guises as you put together your present project or when your promote the project upon its publication - but if you are still giving the same lecture two years after the book is out. Not only is it boring for audiences, but it must be, on some fundamental level, extremely boring for the person giving the lecture.

Some interesting things in these newish talks Slavoj gave at Sewanee recently:

http://htswl.blogspot.com/

Mainly re-cycled bits of the The Neighbor essay, Fragile Absolute and Parallax though.

Amish--thanks for the heads up.

Craig--I agree (which became a problem after Aliens in America came out because people wanted me to come talk about alien stuff and I didn't have much new to say; I ended up doing a little more research and shaping some other stuff in different directions, but it always felt derivative to me). So, for me the nervousness is in this first presentation of new stuff--stuff that I am still really working out. So far, I think that I have 4 more things scheduled that are supposed to push this project, line of thought. That would be the gestating.

Jodi, I think your self doubt is a good thing - if you realized how insightful you were, you would be impossible to talk to :)(tongue firmly in cheek).

Regarding the decline of symbolic efficiency, this is clearly one of the defining issues today. But I wonder if it may be better described in terms of incommensurability? Most people still believe in the Big Other -whether it is God, Science, or some form of Communicative Rationality. The dilema is that each of these, in their more fundamentalist forms, cannot coexist with each other. The fundamentalist cannot tolerate evolution, and the Rationalist cannot accept the absolute truth of the bible. Given this socio-cultural schism, we are left with the impossibility of politics.

So I guess I would disagree with your last point - that "anything that is entered can be changed, altered, revised." For the various fundamentalisms, there are certain absolutes - it is just that each positions "absolute" cannot accomodate or live in the same life world.

Alain--this is helpful. What if we reject the notion of lifeworld? To my mind, that notion designates a coherent symbolic (space/order). And, the crucial thing about the decline of symbolic effiency is not simply incommensurability but the effects of incommensurability on subjects (singular and collective).

Jodi, thanks. Like you, I do not necessarily embrace the notion of life world but I use it in this discussion because I think it reflects the self understanding of those groups I am describing - for fundamentalists, or rationalists, they see themselves within a coherent space - one that would otherwise make sense if not for the presence of other groups who do not see the truth of their validity claims. Where I think Zizek is very helpful (as is your book) is in pointing to irrational kernal at the heart of these conflicts - that the enjoyment of the other somehow interferes with my own Jouissance.

I hope it's not that nationwide nasty cold that hangs around - the cold only lasts for about 5 days, but for 3 weeks after that you wake up "Who hit me with a baseball bat last night?" Suffice to say, avoid alcohol even if you think you feel better - happy holidays.

OK, so you've got a cold and presenters block - oh, pity poor you. Anyway...

Wikipedia is an attempt to revive symbolic efficiency - a response to the classic Future Shock/information overload and a corresponding (but I believe not predicted by Toffler) decline in authority.

The structure of WP is telling - the encyclopedia - a large scope (e.g., all knowledge) project with a narrow focus on each subject.

But I don't think WP's constant revisions is key here - after all, the Britannica (of whose 1972 volumes I spent many hours pulling together junior high book reports) also had revisions. But it just took more time to issue a new publication.

The interesting aspect of WP is the political fights that occur over various entries. Now, I'm sure this happened with Britannica - I imagine a group of walrus-sized English editors with pipes tut-tut ting in their club about the spelling of some lieutenant's name in the Boer War.

These old battles were behind closed doors - we never saw them, just the result. Now, we see the sausage made - and it's not pretty. This is one way symbolic efficiency is diminished - seeing how it is made puts sand in the gears. The famous TLA: TMI (too much information), or "I don't need to know" is directly related to this. Information is not a group of facts, but the result of a negotiation - it’s political.

Politics forces us to decide whether to engage. To have to engage just to know what to think/believe is exhausting at a minimum - and our wish for the Big Other - a standard, an oracle - is shattered and we are confronted with the real of a constantly shifting set of facts (shifting set of negotiations).

Anyway, I love England and I would bring my tea collection to nurse your cold and applaud at inopportune times. But, why are all your conferences in these god-forsaken places and not London or Edinburgh?

P E Bird--your analysis of wikipedia is really helpful--I'm going to use it (and give you credit, of course).

I think the cold you describe is the one I have. I stopped drinking a couple of days ago and it is helping--although the morning headaches, snuffles, and sore throat are still less than desirable.

Rather than why not London, I ask myself, why not Paris? Why not Rome? I should have learned a Romance language and studied French and Italian theorists.

Ha - I'm learning (so to speak) Italian right now. Trying to get to Rome next year.

I wish I had taken Latin in high school. Believe it or not, it was taught in the Los Angeles City School District way back when (way way back).

Anyway, this cold is wicked. About two weeks ago I thought I was better, had a vodka and cranberry and got hammered - felt like I drank 5. So, no (or v.little) drinking for me even now for T.giving (I finally, finally feel better after about 3 weeks).

Get well and I'm sure Newcastle is lovely in the winter. Take coals.

Nothing wrong with Newcastle! 'God forsaken place': no way! Looking forward to having you over, Jodi.

Not so much a decline in symbolic efficiency as a changing regime of symbolic efficiency, methinks. The Big Other is now patterned after the hive mind, an aggregate whcih emerges out of the particular rather than directing it from above.

And is, for that reason, easily conflated with market efficiency.

I think market efficiency isn't the same as the big Other (I know that you aren't saying it is) but occupies some of the space left with the symbolic's retreat. The Lacanian Other has never directed things from the top down--after all, it doesn't exist. Folks presume its existence and act on the basis of this presumption.

Wikipedia would then be another stage in the 'disenchantment of the world'. There is nobody who is supposed to know. An expert is someone another expert says is an expert.

I'm with McKenzie on the different modality of symbolic efficiency, rather than its decline. I've seen discussions of a connectivist sense of epistemology taking over from the more conventional (and outmoded) constructionist sense, and it seems as if the metrics for efficiency are being reconfigured along with the meaning of the symbolic.

I could be persuaded otherwise, but I have yet to see an argument as to why any of the changes in knowing constitute a "retreat..."

Well, I'm doubtful symbolic efficiency is the same as is was in the not so distant past. Is it greater or lesser, is it variable or does it not make any difference?

Although this idea of a connectivist epistemology (hive mind sounds related), seems like a more organic, friendlier Big Other - we just can't seem to do without one.

When you need a new Big Other, probably means the old one isn't working anymore.

Open-ended question: But what are some symptoms of the collapse of the big Other? I'm a little disturbed by how the aphorism "the big Other does not exist" is being bandied about, as this marks the *end of analysis*, not the beginning. Pointing out that daddy was castrated too doesn't do much good for the analysand that is absolutely convinced that daddy is not castrated and that daddy castrated him. The analysand has to traverse his fantasy and discover this castration or incompleteness at the heart of the symbolic for himself. The whole problem in the case of analysis is that the analysand believes the big Other does exist and does everything it can to stave off an encounter with this non-existence. This, in a way, makes the Other exist as a mirage that's always haunting desire. I take it that this is why Lacan is so keen on thematizing fictions as per Bentham: Fictions have efficacy even if they don't exist, which is also why something can both be impossible and necessary for Lacan.

In the case of obsession takes the form of waiting for the master to die, while in the case of hysteria this takes the form of a search for a master that is complete. Over the course of analysis, the obsessional discovers that the master never had it and the hysteric discovers that the master doesn't exist. So I think this generates a first question: How can we distinguish a collapse in symbolic efficacy from a rise in generalized hysteria? It seems to me that it's very easy to confuse the two, as the hysteric perpetually challanges the authority of the master as he seeks to find a genuinely worthy master. But the hysteric is also convinced that such a master exists. It's to Freud's credit that he very quickly learned not to play the game of being the master who knows all. Is the generalized cynicism we find today a collapse of the Other, or a generalized hysteria?

What the neurotic discovers is that belief in the big Other functioned to sustain desire as unsatisfied and to defend against jouissance. Given that we live in a jouissance-laden culture where enjoyment of all forms is so readily available, does it come as a surprise that there's been a tremendous rise in hysteria as a means of sustaining desire in the face of overwhelming jouissance? The hysteric never finds his master and can therefore maintain his desire as unsatisfied, and the obsessional's master never dies and he can therefore maintain his desire as impossible. The collapse of the big Other is traumatic in that it provides no defense against jouissance and no means of sustaining desire, which threatens a collapse of the subject as the subject fades in jouissance.

It seems to me that *belief* in the big Other is still quite pervasive. Professors encounter it in their students all the time with students that question and question as to what you want in the assignment (hysteria) or who go over and above the call of duty (writing a 25 page essay for a 5 page essay) as if to mock the master and steal some jouissance (obsession). In analysis it's encountered every time an analysand begins a session by asking "what would you like me to talk about?" or periodically when they express despair over how they're "doing it [analysis] wrong". All of these things evoke the Other implicitly as a belief in a symbolic norm that there's a right way of doing it, that the professor or analyst has a specific demand, that they know what they want, and so on. I suspect that one of the reasons that Bush is so vigorously defended by his admirers is precisely because he's so clearly "impotent", and his followers thus play the role of the hysteric by supplementing his lack, completing him, and staving off a disasterous encounter with the non-existence of the Other. In all these examples, of course, I'm talking about stand-ins for the Other.

What are some concrete symptoms of the collapse of the Other? Skyrocketing divorce rates that suggest marriage is no longer seen as a binding institution? Distrust of journalism from all sides (is this new?)? Distrust of authority? Is that new? The commodification of education? Are contracts increasingly being broken? Zizek gives a good example in his discussions of the rise of senseless racist violence or what he calls "id-evil", though I'm not entirely sure I agree with his analysis.

I understand the decline of symbolic efficiency in a very simple, perhaps too simple way: symbols don't mean the same thing in multiple places, their meaning is more likely called into question, the variability of the symbol is more immediately apparent. So, symbolic identities like 'worker,' 'man,' 'woman,' 'Black,' 'mother,' 'gay' don't carry enough weight/meaning to anchor/establish anything at all. They are immediately contested, rendered something else, something other. It's part of contemporary culture to acknowledged multiciplicity, fluidity, hybridity. This freaks out religious fundamentalists, who want to try to install new rules and orders. Policy types try to systematize rules and expectations (ethical committees). Schools recognize that they have to account for a variety of differences among students--religious, cultural, ability. The norm drops out in favor of specialized attention, 'appreciation' of the uniqueness of each, each has a talent, etc.

Distrust, as Sinthome mentions, is pervasive (Pew polls point not only to declines in trust in media but to increase in partisanship among reader consumers, who trust, say, Fox, but nothing else--this points back to the 19th century in the US when newspapers were more affiliated with parties, political positions, so not particularly new in terms of print, but a big deal in terms of television, I like it to change in media law under Reagan, I think).

It seems to me that attachment to stand ins for the Other might be considered in terms of a kind of desperation for the Law in the wake of the decline of symbolic efficiency.

Jodi, I think Sinthome's point nicely compliments what you are saying: the collapse in symbolic efficacy can be seen to manifest itelf as a generalized form of hysteria. So I don't think it is an either/or - generalized hysteria can be viewed as a symptom of the collapse. But it still leaves us with the dilema of how to traverse the fantasy and move beyond the impass.

There is a difference between "There is no Big Other" and "The Big Other doesn't exist".

The first is a factual statement, the second one of belief.

The first may come from the analyst; the second must come from the analysand.

There is no doubt that throughout history, symbolic systems reshuffle and that creates anxiety.

Also, systems of power require the Big Other to incorporate the power relation as a natural right; patriarchy being the paradigm.

Hysteria and symbolic collapse are closely related, when hysteria in general rises, that's a clue that the dominant symbolic system is dysfunctional. It also means that most likely a set of alternative, competing symbolisms are active.

I don't know about "stand-ins" for the Big Other - there always has to be a stand-in (at least, that's my understanding of symbolic systems).

But I do get that during a symbolic reshuffle (if that term is coinable, I now claim it for the public realm) any number of symbols can act as big others for various communities. I think the psychological impact of having shifting big others, rather than a single Big Other, over an individual's lifetime is significant, and probably historically unique, but I don't know what that implies.

But there must be a difference between a generalized reshuffle (part of history's doing business) and a crisis stage (a fundamental collapse). Or perhaps late capital is just an ongoing series of symbolic reshuffling to sustain power by keeping the rest of us crazy.

By "stand-ins" of the big Other I only meant representatives of the big Other. We never directly encounter something like the big Other, only figures that stand in the place of the big Other such as dissertation committees, police officers, teachers, parents, government officials, priests, etc. When relating to figures such as this we don't relate to them as persons, but as symbolic roles. A friend of mine once helped out on the SPEP conference, which is the largest continental philosophy conference in the States. His job consisted in signing people in when they arrived. In a number of instances he had no information about people who had nonetheless registered early. These people expressed shock and dismay that he didn't have their information, as if he had some secret connection to the entire beauracracy of SPEP. This would be an example of standing in the place of the big Other, I think... He was no longer a person, but a symbolic function that was supposed or believed to have transparent insight into the workings of the entire system.

I'll be quick--I didn't think that sinthome and I were disagreeing and I'm sorry if my point came across that way; I was just adding an agreeing gloss.

The problem however is to think this historically. I would extremely skeptical about claims that there is is some unique historical rupture happening right now. Yes, some forms of authority are in decline, but perhaps others are rising. People don't trust their doctors but they don trust herbal medicine, etc. No 'decline in symbolic efficiency' there, just a change in the symbols.

Ken--I disagree: the profusion of little symbols with fragile and local efficiency is not the same as a symbolic order. An herbal remedy means different things to different folks; it appears as an irresolvable conflict with mainstream medicine; it appears as an option; it appears as nutty. Both the conflict and the options are more immediate in the past--particularly in the sense that it's impossible to decide between them.

The 'newness' here is not like since 9/11 or anything like that but more like since the late 60s-early 70s (that's when, I think, Lacan moves away from his emphasis on the symbolic to his emphasis on lichettes and little bits of enjoyment momentarily anchoring meaning; Richard Middleton calls this a sinthomic social field, I think; I like the term decline of symbolic efficiency, myself). At any rate, I think material changes in technology and the global capitalist economy accelerate this decline/collapse.

I think that if there were a "true" belief in the big Other, we would not have students that question and question assignments. I think this is a symptom of an unlocalized / dissolving other. The professor does not stand in anymore – who/what does? The institution, their symbolic career, MCAT scores, economic uncertainty?

It's the belief in a belief of a big other that is pervasive – which is very different from a belief in the big Other. We desperately want it but can't find it. And this must be associated with a collapse in the symbolic order, if the symbolic order functions to situate the unconscious with the Other (which is my admittedly amateur understanding).

I also want to try to avoid confusing the imaginary – ego axis – with the symbolic. I think that a number of what we call symbols are imaginary projections – attempts by the ego to ignore the unconscious. It gets conflated / confused, especially when we map these psychological categories against sociological phenomena. I am guilty of this when I speak of a symbolic collapse; I have been taking a class / cultural view, but it has a different meaning when applied to an individual’s symbolic collapse.

I think some of the examples used – “family”, “worker”, “man”, “women”, “black” are now more properly relegated to the imaginary – whereas not too long ago (25 years?) one could say they were in the symbolic realm.

Finally, I take the position that there is something unique happening, that it is not simply a new set of symbols, a new boss just like the old boss kind of thing.

Maybe the expression "questioning assignments" is misleading. I was not speaking of students *challenging* assignments, but rather those students that are obsessed with what the professor *wants* of them, with how to properly do the assignment in order to please the professor, with what the *right* way of doing the assignment is. I assure you, these students have not disappeared and are certainly not uncommon... At least in my teaching experience, I can't speak for the experience of others.

This is also a somewhat testable hypothesis. There's a whole body of tender-hearted pedagogical theory out there among the composition studies folk that advocate either not giving grades at all, or having students grade their own work. Speaking anecdotally from my own experience, this practice has the paradoxical effect of *creating more* anxiety among the students, rather than *less* anxiety, because students are forcibly confronted with the enigma of the Other's desire or the question "what grade does the Other want me to give myself?", "what does the Other *really* think of me?" and so on. It has the effect of activating the worst aspects of the student's unconscious fantasies in relation to the person of the professor. The question of the hysteric is always "tell me what I am, damn it!" (often so the subject can then go on to prove the master that names the subject wrong), and the subject experiences intolerable anxiety in the face of not being told or defined by the agent of the Other. Another school of composition studies has developed a practice called "minimal marking" where you don't write comments on student papers, but instead underline here and there and put check marks in the margins. This marking practice can have extraordinary effects, not unlike Lacanian oracular interpretation, where the student reads all sorts of things into the check mark and significantly revises their essay in response to a *sign* of some sort of desire that is without a signified. Once again, a sort of anxiety provoked through an encounter with the Other, screaming for the Other to define the person.

I think there's an entire segment of students that convince themselves that there's a right way of doing assignments and that they're incapable of doing it, which leads them to not complete the assignment at all. This is a variant of the hysterical structure that perpetually experiences itself as not being the object of desire, as being the wrong thing, as a way of defending against the jouissance of the Other.

I would never suggest it 9-11 is linked to this in some way. My tendency is to believe the same, that technology leads to changes in how we think the symbolic, so I'm not sure of the nature of our disagreement, if any.

What I am still confused by is the notion of a decline, and there I may find some tension, as I cannot fathom how the symbolic was anything other than in a crisis of efficiency, always already on the decline; more certainly, I cannot fathom a time since the concept's formation in which the conditions would be otherwise. That the concept and its decline emerge from the same changes in technics seems, well, pretty intuitive.

There is something here. (And my sense that there is is why I read Zizek, and want to read Badiou.) Wikification is interesting, though there is a faint wrong note. Wikis allow keeping track of versions in perpetuity (given world enough and time, i.e. a big server). So no information is lost, although exactly which version is the correct one is always contested. (Though again, that depends on how you set-up the wiki: some can be feudal, some republican and/or democratic, some anarchic.) But then having multiple versions, or having access always to every possible future--that is dizzying and productive of skepticism, or shuddering in a closet.

ps: I hope your paper goes well. I was looking for a good complement to Pinocchio Theory and this is it.

Thanks, Robert, and nice to have you join in. I think your point about no information is lost is important--but is it true? That is, I thought I read an article in the NYT recently about entries being deleted (like, one on "Pookie" who I thing is the stuffed animal of a comic strip character and one on music that features cowbells). Even if the pedantic point is right, it doesn't disrupt your larger point regarding digitalization and memory--blogs, with their archive features, are another good example here.

And thanks for associating I Cite with the Pinnochio Theory. I admire Steve's writing and thinking very, very much (I also like him as a person).

I like your use of the word wikification, but I feel obliged to point out that it already has a quite different meaning - the process of incorporating material into the wiki.

Wikify - To format using Wiki markup (as opposed to plain text or HTML) and add internal links to material, incorporating it into the whole of Wikipedia. Noun: Wikification. Sometimes shortened to wfy.

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